Two-Pronged Colonialism

And the Origins of Ethnic Tensions in British Burma

Introduction

Scholars of both South and Southeast Asian history have been divided on which area of study the modern history of Burma belongs in. While culturally and ethnically similar to neighbouring Southeast Asian countries like Thailand and Laos, its status as a colonial province of India from 1885 until 1937 complicates matters, especially considering the fact that Burma is largely absent in many studies of colonial India [1]. Omitting an entire province from the history of colonial India simply because it is now a separate country is anachronistic and means that the full range of experiences under the policies and administration of the British Raj remains unrepresented.

However, when specifically studying Burma, omitting this critical piece of history would be almost unthinkable. It is in the fifty-year period that Burma was colonized and governed as part of British India where we find the beginning roots of the majority of the social and economic problems that currently exist. Namely, these problems include intense ethnic divides and extreme politicization of ethnicity by the military leadership that has been in place for most of the post-independence era. Colonial administration was a “profound moment of rupture” for the established Indigenous order that had existed during the Konbaung dynasty, where the central Bamar-dominated monarchy rarely attempted to interfere with the activities of Burma’s vast, numerous, and nomadic minority ethnic groups [2]. As time went on, the British gradually gave more rights to Indians within Burma in terms of governance and administration, disenfranchising the Bamar and other groups by denying them autonomy [3]. In this sense, it has been commonly purported by many Burmese nationalists and scholars that Burma was colonized twice, first by the British and then by the Indians.

The Konbaung Dynasty

Burma’s status as a province of India for the majority of the colonial period was the main precipitating factor for the ethnic tensions that continue to exist to the present day, between the Bamar majority of the Irrawaddy basin, ethnic minority hill tribes, and Indian and Chinese foreigners within the country. Considering Burmese history in the colonial period as part of South Asian history is thus essential to expand upon the dominant historical narrative and understand the different impacts and effects the administration had on different regions and groups.

While general disorder and conflict were present in the lands encompassing modern-day Myanmar for centuries before the British arrived, the Konbaung dynasty saw widespread administrative reforms and was considered a period of relative peace and prosperity between Burma’s various ethnic groups. As the Bamar were and continue to be the region’s majority ethnicity, they composed the country’s monarchy, civil service, and upper class. Much of the commoner society was organized around the patron-client relationship, where bonded persons (kyun) would serve under patrons in the crown, religious or private sector [4]. While the word kyun has been translated to ‘slave’ in many modern texts, this is inaccurate. While certain groups were privileged over others and hierarchical values were embedded in society that might be considered unjust today, kyuns were paid for their work and not subject to entrenched mistreatment, highlighting the primary value of order and stability based on existing methods of governance that existed in the Konbaung dynasty [5].

King Thibaw being escorted to captivity by British soldiers, Burma, 1885. Photo taken from the National Army Museum.

Political identity as a whole during this period was relatively unconcerned with ethnicity. It was common for people to identify with the ethnicity or religion of their patrons, not viewing themselves as part of a larger state structure or nationalist entity [6]. Differences were sometimes acknowledged, such as through providing different living quarters or neighbourhoods for clients that were ethnic or religious minorities, but these aspects of identity were not used as political tools to garner support or opposition to the monarchy or overall state, and were largely considered fluid and mutable [7].

The nature of governance leading up to the colonial period was highly decentralized, with disparate hill tribes only nominally being under government control, keeping up a very minimal relationship with the central administration through paying tributes and other

symbolic acts [8]. While certain minorities were not always satisfied with their place in the Union and would sometimes rebel against policies and government actions that they did not agree with, they had considerable autonomy and freedom and were able to mostly govern themselves and their lands as they saw fit. The political relationship between them and the central governing authorities was one of “protection and service,” rather than one “backed by coercive power.” [9] This social order of established hierarchy, tolerance, and relative freedom would quickly deteriorate upon the arrival of British colonialism and the establishment of Burma as a province of India.

The British Colonization of Burma

The official colonization of Burma occurred after the British victory in the Third Anglo-Burmese War in 1886, and immediately sparked deep resentment among the Bamar population. At once, the British began implementing rigid divide-and-rule policies to aid in their governance and began a violent repression of the Bamar who rebelled or resisted [10]. Ethnic minorities, or ‘frontier peoples,’ quickly proved to be hard to govern in their own right. Peoples such as the Shan, the Kachin, the Chin, and the Kayah lived in rugged territory and initially put up just as much of a rebellious struggle against colonialism [11]. They eventually settled on a system of indirect rule, just as had been seen during the Konbaung dynasty; relying on local leaders to handle affairs on their own, and directly interfering only on rare occasions.

Though the British had eliminated Buddhism as the official religion of Burma and touted religious neutrality, they were obligated to support many Western missionaries who arrived and became successful at converting large numbers of ethnic minorities to Christianity, and providing schools and other basic infrastructure to tribal regions [12]. Many families saw Christian or secular education as a means for survival in this new colonial system; this resulted in the cultural divide between the Bamar majority and ethnic minorities widening even further [13]. The vast majority of development in industry, business, and transport occurred near Rangoon and along the Irrawaddy, meaning that the Bamar were exposed to modernization while most ethnic minorities still lived in underdeveloped, quasi-feudal societies, contributing to Bamar stereotypes of minorities as primitive and unsophisticated [14].

The Politicization of Ethnicity

Perhaps the largest inflammatory policy for ethnic tensions was the overall makeup of the colonial administration and institutions. Seeking to deprivilege the Bamar majority in order to quell rebellion, they sought to recruit Burma’s ethnic minorities to fill the government and military, including as high-ranking officials. This was also done because minorities had been more acquiescent to the secular education delivered by British institutions, and thus were seen as preferable to carry out the functions of the state [15]. This permanently affected the Bamar, who were now excluded from government and deprioritized in most other sectors, and fostered even further hatred for minority groups who were now seen as agents of the colonial state.

It was not only minority groups, however, that the British administration privileged over the Bamar. From the beginning of colonial rule, the British encouraged the mass migration of Indians, mainly single young men, to fill both skilled and unskilled labour positions and contribute to the development of the province [16]. Prominent Indian businessmen and officials would also be encouraged to migrate and begin operations out of Burma for the export of rice, petroleum products, oil, and other commodities in large supply [17]. All of Burma’s top export companies during the colonial period were foreign-owned and operated, and the Bamars only found limited employment opportunities, mostly in unskilled labour related to rice cultivation [18].

Paradoxically, Burma’s status as a province of India made it easier for it to be integrated into the larger colonial empire, which benefited British officials and the Indian upper class. However, it was rarely ever given the same level of administrative attention as India proper, which deprived the Indigenous population. Indian domination would come to extend into nearly every aspect of society. They filled top positions in Rangoon banks, post offices, telegraph departments, prisons, and hospitals, bringing training, qualifications, and language skills that the Bamars lacked [19]. They made up the majority of the colonial military, along with the aforementioned minority groups who were recruited to serve in ethnic battalions [20]. To a lesser extent, the Chinese were also encouraged to migrate to the area, which sparked disdain for them as well. While the British administration never achieved a complete integration of Burma into India proper, Rangoon and other urbanized regions essentially became copies of imperial Indian cities [21].

A further example of this was the British-founded University of Rangoon, Burma’s only academic institution, which had a student body that was less than half Indigenous and a faculty that was entirely Indian [22]. Aung San, then a young student, along with several others, were vocal about this issue and the various other ways in which the Bamar were pushed out of society by both Indians and ethnic minorities [23]. The politicization of ethnicity in this way meant that Burma was more divided along ethnic and religious lines than it had ever been before. This formed the basis for potent nationalist sentiment, both on the part of ethnic minorities but especially for the Bamar, who held vitriolic hatred for anything and anyone associated with the colonial system that placed them at the bottom rungs of society.

Gen. Aung San, then leader of the Myanmar government, arriving at the residence and office of Britian's Prime Minister in London on Jan 13, 1947. Photo taken from AP News.

The Aftermath of Burma’s Independence From India

Burma’s eventual independence from India in 1937 and the outbreak of the Second World War would see what was largely the end of Indian domination over Burma; Indians fled the country in swathes in the lead-up to independence [24]. The ones who sought to return when the war ended were excluded from their former positions of power by Burmese nationalists, leaving a country full of the disenfranchised and unskilled Bamar who had been barred from the workforce for over fifty years [25]. Indians in Burma from this point on have been viewed with intense xenophobia and racism, even up to the present day. As for ethnic minorities, while Aung San publicly preached inclusion and tolerance at the Panglong Conference of 1947, he acknowledged that it would be “difficult to make years of distrust of the frontier peoples for the Burman to disappear immediately” [26]. The British representatives and Aung San excluded many tribal groups from negotiations on the basis that they were too primitive, and only saw the Bamar and the Shan peoples as capable of holding positions of authority in a unified Burma [27].

Conclusion

It is for all of the above outlined reasons that many of the ethnic tensions that define the modern nation of Burma can be traced back to the policies administered by British and

proxy-Indian officials during Burma’s period as a province of colonial India. It is intense xenophobia and racism cultivated during this time, combined with other precipitating factors, that would prompt General Ne Win to implement the ambitious ‘Burmese Way to Socialism’ policy in the 1960s. This would see Burma almost entirely isolated from the rest of Asia and the world for nearly thirty years, completely destroying the economy and leaving all Burmese citizens defenceless against an increasingly cruel ruling military junta.

When examining Burma’s ‘colonial inheritance’, as Southeast Asian historian Ian Brown describes it, one must take care to not attribute modern-day problems as entirely the fault of determinist colonial policies, as this effectively absolves the current authoritarian regime of their failings and intentional abuses. Rather, Burma’s unique situation of two-pronged colonialism can in this case serve as a foundational stepping stone for understanding how much of Burma’s economy and society developed in the 20th century. At the same time, it can expand historian’s views on the nature of British imperialism in South Asia as a whole.

Endnotes

[1] Jonathan Saha. “Is it India? Colonial Burma as a ‘Problem’ in South Asian History.” South Asian History and Culture Vol. 7 No. 1 (2016) 24.

[2] Saha, 24.

[3] Zhu Xianghui, Frontier Ethnic Minorities and the Making of the Modern Union of Myanmar: The Origin of State-Building and Ethnonationalism. New York, NY: Peter Lang Publishers; 2023. 55.

[4] Michael Aung-Thwin. “Hierarchy and Order in Pre-Colonial Burma.” Journal of Southeast Asian Studies Vol. 15, No. 2 (1984) 224.

[5] Aung-Thwin, 226.

[6] Robert H. Taylor, “Do States Make Nations? The Politics of Identity in Myanmar, Revisited.” South East Asia Research Vol. 13 No. 3 (2005) 265.

[7] Taylor, 266.

[8] Xianghui, 29.

[9] Taylor, 266.

[10] TinTin Delphin. Burma’s Path to Democracy: the Military, Aung San Suu Kyi, and the Rohingya. New York, NY: Algora Publishing; 2020, 20.

[11] Xianghui, 45-46.

[12] Delphin, 21.

[13] Taylor, 272.

[14] Xianghui, 30.

[15] Taylor, 272.

[16] Delphin, 20-21

[17] Ian Brown, “Tracing Burma’s Economic Failure to its Colonial Inheritance.” The Business History Review Vol. 85, No. 4 (2011) 729.

[18] Brown, 730.

[19] Brown, 730.

[20] Delphin, 21.

[21] Saha, 23.

[22] Taylor, 272.

[23] Delphin, 20.

[24] Brown, 733-734.

[25] Brown, 739.

[26] Xianghui, 117.

[27] Xianghui, 118.

Bibliography

Taylor, Robert H. “Do States Make Nations? The Politics of Identity in Myanmar, Revisited.” South East Asia Research Vol. 13 No. 3 (2005) pp. 261-286

Aung-Thwin, Michael. “Hierarchy and Order in Pre-Colonial Burma.” Journal of Southeast Asian Studies Vol. 15, No. 2 (1984) pp. 224-232.

Brown, Ian. “Tracing Burma’s Economic Failure to its Colonial Inheritance.” The Business History Review Vol. 85, No. 4 (2011) pp. 725-747.

Delphin, TinTin. Burma’s Path to Democracy: the Military, Aung San Suu Kyi, and the Rohingya. New York, NY: Algora Publishing; 2020.

Saha, Jonathan. “Is it India? Colonial Burma as a ‘Problem’ in South Asian History.”South Asian History and Culture Vol. 7 No. 1 (2016) pp. 23-29.

Xianghui, Zhu. Frontier Ethnic Minorities and the Making of the Modern Union of Myanmar: The Origin of State-Building and Ethnonationalism. New York, NY: Peter Lang Publishers; 2023.